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CITY GOVERNMENTS AND  
PREDATORY LENDING 
Jonathan L. Entin* and Shadya Y. Yazback†
Predatory lending has generated increasing attention in recent years.  
The practice involves loans to homeowners who frequently cannot pay the 
associated costs and therefore lose their homes.  Predatory lending is 
heavily concentrated in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods1 and 
disproportionately affects minorities2 and the elderly.3  The consequences 
of predatory lending are devastating not only to the consumers who fall 
prey to unscrupulous lenders’ tactics, but to the community as a whole.4  
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law and Political Science, Case 
Western Reserve University. 
† Senior Policy Analyst, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.  The views expressed here are 
those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve System or the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Cleveland. 
 1. HUD-TREASURY TASK FORCE ON PREDATORY LENDING, CURBING PREDATORY HOME 
MORTGAGE LENDING 47 (2000), available at 
http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/treasrpt.pdf [hereinafter HUD Report]; Paul S. 
Calem et al., The Neighborhood Distribution of Subprime Mortgage Lending, 29 J. REAL 
EST. FIN. & ECON. 393, 401 (2004) [hereinafter Calem et al., Neighborhood Distribution]; 
Paul S. Calem et al., Neighborhood Patterns of Subprime Lending: Evidence from Disparate 
Cities, 15 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 603, 611 (2004) [hereinafter Calem et al., Neighborhood 
Patterns].  Although predatory loans are disproportionately subprime, not all subprime loans 
are predatory.  See infra text accompanying note 8 and following note 15. 
 2. HUD Report, supra note 1, at 47; Calem et al., Neighborhood Distribution, supra 
note 1, at 401; Calem et al., Neighborhood Patterns, supra note 1, at 615. 
 3. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CONSUMER PROTECTION: FEDERAL AND STATE 
AGENCIES FACE CHALLENGES IN COMBATING PREDATORY LENDING 14 (2004), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04280.pdf [hereinafter GAO Report]. 
 4. The Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland has explained: 
Predatory lending is a national problem that is reallocating public and private 
dollars away from low-and-moderate-income families and struggling inner-city 
neighborhoods to a variety of private parties.  Federal and local tax dollars have 
been invested in such communities, adding to private donations, church 
contributions, bank loans made under [the Community Reinvestment Act], and 
work done by nonprofits and community volunteer organizations such as Habitat 
for Humanity. 
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Predatory Lending Strikes at the Heart of American 
Neighborhoods, Community Reinvestment Forum 2 (Summer 2000), available at 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/CommAffairs/CRForum/frmsp00/Smr00.pdf. 
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For these reasons, many cities have tried to regulate or prohibit the 
practice. 
This Article assesses the legal challenges that cities can face in trying to 
deal with predatory lending.5  Part I provides an overview of the problem.  
Part II focuses on the common law and statutory claims that cities might 
bring, with particular emphasis on the evidentiary issues that cities can face 
and the requirements of standing that could severely limit the effectiveness 
of lawsuits brought by municipalities.  The Article then turns to city efforts 
to regulate predatory lending pursuant to their home rule authority, efforts 
that can be stymied both by state laws that supersede municipal ordinances 
and federal regulations that preempt state and local initiatives.  Part III 
focuses on home rule, explaining that most courts that have addressed the 
question have held municipal initiatives to be preempted by state laws. Part 
IV shows that the federal government might override much of what cities 
and states try to do to attack the problem.  The article concludes that, 
despite the legal obstacles facing cities that want to regulate predatory 
lending, local efforts have served as a catalyst for predatory lending 
policies at the state level and might stimulate more effective national 
policies as well. 
 
 5. We do not address the wisdom or effectiveness of predatory-lending laws, a subject 
that has generated considerable discussion.  On the wisdom of such laws, compare GAO 
Report, supra note 3, at 76 (suggesting that market forces will eventually eliminate 
predatory lending), with Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Predatory Lending: What 
Does Wall Street Have to Do with It?, 15 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 715 (2004) (arguing that 
the market cannot impose sufficient discipline to drive out predatory lenders), and Patricia 
A. McCoy, A Behavioral Analysis of Predatory Lending, 38 AKRON L. REV. 725 (2005) 
(using findings from behavioral economics to claim that borrowers do not act in accordance 
with the assumptions underlying the position of advocates of the market approach).  On the 
effectiveness of North Carolina’s pioneering law in this field, compare Gregory Elliehausen 
& Michael E. Staten, Regulation of Subprime Mortgage Products: An Analysis of North 
Carolina’s Predatory Lending Law, 29 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 411 (2004) (concluding 
that the statute reduced the availability of credit to lower-income consumers), with Keith D. 
Harvey & Peter J. Nigro, Do Predatory Lending Laws Influence Mortgage Lending?  An 
Analysis of the North Carolina Predatory Lending Law, 29 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 435 
(2004) (finding that the measure resulted in less aggressive marketing by non-bank lenders 
and that minority and lower-income borrowers were less likely to get loans), and Roberto G. 
Quercia et al., Assessing the Impact of North Carolina’s Predatory Lending Law, 15 
HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 573 (2004) (arguing that the law succeeded in reducing abusive 
practices without restricting access to legitimate subprime loans).  On the limited utility of 
disclosure requirements as a remedy, see Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits 
of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 754-806 
(2006). 
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I. A PRIMER ON PREDATORY LENDING 
Predatory lending has yet to be defined in a comprehensive fashion.  A 
joint report issued in June 2000 by the U.S. Department of the Treasury and 
U.S. Department for Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) noted: 
“Although home mortgage lending is regulated by state and federal 
authorities, none of the statu[t]es and regulations governing mortgage 
transactions provides a definition of predatory lending.”6
Defining predatory lending is difficult for two reasons.  First, loan 
attributes may or may not be “predatory” depending on the sophistication 
or financial position of the borrower.7  Second, the definition of predatory 
lending cannot be static because the lending market is always evolving in 
light of technological, regulatory, and judicial advancements. 
It is important to distinguish predatory lending from subprime lending.  
Subprime lending—the extension of credit to consumers who would be 
unable to obtain credit in the primary market—typically involves higher 
interest rates and fees to account for the increased risk associated with a 
particular consumer’s credit history.  The higher rates are not predatory per 
se.  It is the circumstances surrounding the loan that typically make the 
loan predatory.8  For that reason, most government agencies and academic 
experts define predatory lending in terms of specific elements, practices, or 
effects.  In 2001, then-Federal Reserve Governor Edward Gramlich 
proposed an approach to predatory lending that, defined the practice in 
terms of elements: 
[T]ypically predatory lending involves at least one, and perhaps all three, 
of the following elements: 
making unaffordable loans based on the assets of the borrower rather 
than on the borrower’s ability to repay an obligation (“asset-based 
lending”) 
inducing a borrower to refinance a loan repeatedly in order to charge 
high points and fees each time the loan is refinanced (“loan flipping”) 
engaging in fraud or deception to conceal the true nature of the loan 
obligation from an unsuspecting or unsophisticated borrower.9
More expansive government definitions include a list of specific 
 6. HUD Report, supra note 1, at 1. 
 7. GAO Report, supra note 3, at 19. 
 8. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and 
Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1261 (2002). 
 9. Fed. Reserve Gov. Edward Gramlich, Remarks at Cleveland State University, 
Cleveland, Ohio (Mar. 23, 2001), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2001/20010323/default.htm. 
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practices.  The U.S. Government Accountability Office (formerly known as 
the General Accounting Office) provides perhaps the most comprehensive 
definition: 
While there is no universally accepted definition, predatory lending is 
associated with the following loan characteristics and lending practices: 
Excessive fees.  Abusive loans may include fees that greatly exceed 
the amounts justified by the costs of the services provided and the 
credit and interest rate risks involved.  Lenders may add these fees to 
the loan amounts rather than requiring payment up front, so the 
borrowers may not know the exact amount of the fees they are 
paying. 
Excessive interest rates.  Mortgage interest rates can legitimately 
vary based on the characteristics of borrowers (such as 
creditworthiness) and of the loans themselves.  However, in some 
cases, lenders may charge interest rates that far exceed what would be 
justified by any risk-based pricing calculation, or lenders may “steer” 
a borrower with an excellent credit record to a higher-rate loan 
intended for borrowers with poor credit histories. 
Single-premium credit insurance.  Credit insurance is a loan product 
that repays the lender should the borrower die or become disabled.  In 
the case of single-premium credit insurance, the full premium is paid 
all at once—by being added to the amount financed in the loan—
rather than on a monthly basis.  Because adding the full premium to 
the amount of the loan unnecessarily raises the amount of interest 
borrowers pay, single-premium credit insurance is generally 
considered inherently abusive. 
Lending without regard to ability to repay.  Loans may be made 
without regard to a borrower’s ability to repay the loan.  In these 
cases, the loan is approved based on the value of the asset (the home) 
that is used as collateral.  In particularly egregious cases, monthly 
loan payments have equaled or exceeded the borrower’s total 
monthly income.  Such lending can quickly lead to foreclosure of the 
property. 
Loan flipping.  Mortgage originators may refinance borrowers’ loans 
repeatedly in a short period of time without any economic gain for 
the borrower.  With each successive refinancing, these originators 
charge high fees that “strip” borrowers’ equity in their homes. 
Fraud and deception.  Predatory lenders may perpetrate outright 
fraud through actions such as inflating property appraisals and 
doctoring loan applications and settlement documents.  Lenders may 
also deceive borrowers by using “bait and switch” tactics that mislead 
borrowers about the terms of their loan.  Unscrupulous lenders may 
fail to disclose items as required by law or in other ways may take 
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advantage of borrowers’ lack of financial sophistication. 
Prepayment penalties.  Penalties for prepaying a loan are not 
necessarily abusive, but predatory lenders may use them to trap 
borrowers in high-cost loans. 
Balloon payments.  Loans with balloon payments are structured so 
that monthly payments are lower but one large payment (the balloon 
payment) is due when the loan matures.  Predatory loans may contain 
a balloon payment that the borrower is unlikely to be able to afford, 
resulting in foreclosure or refinancing with additional high costs and 
fees.  Sometimes, lenders market a low monthly payment without 
adequate disclosure of the balloon payment.10
In the legal arena, Professors Engel and McCoy have produced a 
definition of predatory lending that focuses on the composition of the loan 
to determine whether it is predatory.  While most of the Engel-McCoy 
definition is encompassed in the GAO definition, Professors Engel and 
McCoy also include waiver of meaningful legal redress—usually through 
mandatory arbitration clauses that require borrowers to waive judicial 
redress and class action participation—as an indicator of a predatory 
loan.11
From the above definitions, one can distill a definition of predatory 
lending in its broadest conception: predatory lending occurs when a lender 
extends to a consumer a loan with unfavorable terms that are structured to 
strip the equity from the home, possibly resulting in foreclosure on the 
home used to secure the loan and personal bankruptcy for the consumer. 
The definitional complexity makes it difficult to quantify the aggregate 
costs of predatory lending.  The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act12 
(“HMDA”) requires that mortgage lenders with an office in a metropolitan 
statistical area disclose data related to all the home mortgages they make 
each year.13  HMDA data cover approximately 80 percent of all home 
loans nationwide.14  The HMDA data show that 26.2 percent of covered 
loans had annual percentage rates sufficient to trigger coverage by the 
 10. GAO Report, supra note 3, at 18-19. 
 11. Engel & McCoy, supra note 8, at 1260; see also Kathleen Engel & Patricia McCoy, 
Predatory Lending and Community Development at Loggerheads 5 (Cleveland Marshall 
Legal Studies Paper 05-105, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=687161. 
 12. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2811 (2000). 
 13. A metropolitan statistical area is defined by the U.S. Bureau of the Census based on 
economic and commuting flows between contiguous counties based on decennial census 
data.  See Population Div., U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Lists of Metropolitan and 
Micropolitan Statistical Areas and Definitions (2006), 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/estimates/metrodef.html. 
 14. Robert B. Avery et al., Higher-Priced Home Lending and the 2005 HMDA Data, 
FED. RES. BULL., Sept. 2006, at A123, A123. 
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federal predatory lending laws,15 but not all loans covered by the federal 
predatory lending laws are necessarily predatory in nature.  Even if 
comprehensive data were available about every home loan, it would still be 
impossible to identify the number of loans that are predatory, as no data set 
could accurately measure the lender’s intent—a critical element of 
predatory lending.  Despite the problems of data availability, some 
researchers have attempted to quantify the costs: an oft-cited 2001 report 
estimated that predatory lending cost consumers roughly $9.1 billion 
annually.16
II. CITIES AS LITIGANTS: STANDING AND OTHER DIFFICULTIES 
Because the direct victims of predatory lending are disproportionately 
the elderly, minorities, and the less affluent, one might expect that cities 
would seek to represent these victims by asserting claims on their behalf 
against those engaging in these destructive practices.  After all, the 
Supreme Court has long recognized the legitimacy of parens patriae suits 
in which governments represent the interests of their constituents.  The 
earliest decision to this effect came in the 1900 case of Louisiana v. 
Texas,17 which rejected the claim on the merits but nevertheless observed 
that “the State is entitled to seek relief in this way because the matters 
complained of affect her citizens at large.”18  The Court’s most 
comprehensive discussion of parens patriae standing appears in Alfred L. 
Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez.19  According to Snapp, a 
parens patriae action seeks to vindicate “quasi-sovereign” interests.20  
Those interests include a government’s concern for “the health and well-
being—both physical and economic—of its residents in general.”21  The 
action must promote “an interest apart from the interests of particular 
private parties” and involve “a sufficiently substantial segment of [the] 
population.”22
It is unclear whether cities could maintain parens patriae actions over 
predatory lending.  All of the Supreme Court cases discussed in the 
 15. Id. at A132. 
 16. ERIC STEIN, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, QUANTIFYING THE COST OF PREDATORY 
LENDING 2 (2001), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/Quant10-01.pdf. 
 17. 176 U.S. 1 (1900). 
 18. Id. at 19. 
 19. 458 U.S. 592 (1982).  For a review of other parens patriae cases, see Hawaii v. 
Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 257-60 (1972). 
 20. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 602. 
 21. Id. at 607. 
 22. Id.  The Court has also made clear that states may not pursue parens patriae cases 
against the federal government.  Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485-86 (1923). 
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previous paragraph involved claims by states.23  The Court has never 
specifically considered whether cities or other political subdivisions may 
pursue such claims, but its treatment of these subordinate units strongly 
implies that they may not do so.  For example, the “state action” exemption 
from the antitrust laws24 does not apply to municipalities, counties, or 
similar subordinate units.  Those units do not enjoy the attributes of 
sovereignty that states possess.25  Specifically, our system “has no place for 
sovereign cities.”26  This position reflects a more general view that cities 
and other political subdivisions do not enjoy the protection of the Eleventh 
Amendment because they are not sovereign.  The Court so held in the 1890 
case of Lincoln County v. Luning.27  Although that decision has come 
under widespread criticism,28 it has been consistently reaffirmed, most 
recently in the 2001 case of Board of Trustees v. Garrett.29
Despite the Supreme Court’s silence, lower federal courts have 
consistently held that municipalities and other political subdivisions may 
not pursue parens patriae actions.30  Those rulings rely on those units’ lack 
 23. The statute under which Snapp arose treated Puerto Rico as a state.  Snapp, 458 U.S. 
at 594 n.1, 608 n.15. 
  Nothing in Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007), affects the analysis here.  
Whatever that case’s implications for the scope of parens patriae standing in general, the 
dispute there had nothing to do with municipal standing.  The only issue dividing the Court 
was whether a state had standing to challenge the federal government’s refusal to regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions.  Compare id. at 1454-55 & n.17 with id. at 1465-66 & n.1 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 24. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
 25. Cmty. Commc’ns Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 53-54 (1982); City of 
Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 411-12 (1978) (plurality opinion). 
 26. Cmty. Commc’ns, 455 U.S. at 53. 
 27. 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890) (observing that “while the county is territorially a part of 
the state, yet politically it is also a corporation created by, and with such powers as are given 
to it by, the state”).  Lincoln County, which held that political subdivisions did not enjoy 
Eleventh Amendment protection, was decided on the same day as Hans v. Louisiana, 134 
U.S. 1 (1890), which significantly expanded the protection that states enjoy under that 
provision. 
 28. See Melvyn R. Durchslag, Should Political Subdivisions Be Accorded Eleventh 
Amendment Immunity?, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 577, 580 (1994) (summarizing the negative 
scholarly reaction to the decision). 
 29. 531 U.S. 356, 369 (2001); see also, e.g., Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. 
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977); Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 233 (1964). 
 30. Some lower courts have avoided the issue in situations where a ruling on the point 
was not essential to the decision.  See, e.g., City of Olmsted Falls v. FAA, 292 F.3d 261, 
268 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (finding that the city had standing to sue on the basis of injury to 
itself); La Crosse County v. Gershman, Brickner & Bratton, Inc., 982 F.2d 1171, 1175 (7th 
Cir. 1993) (holding that the county had standing to sue as a direct purchaser of services); 
City of N.Y. v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 729, 733 n.3 (2d Cir. 1984) (observing that there was no 
dispute over the standing of other parties), aff’d sub nom. Bowen v. City of N.Y., 476 U.S. 
467 (1986). 
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of sovereignty, precisely the grounds that the Supreme Court has 
emphasized in the Eleventh Amendment and antitrust contexts.31  
Accordingly, cities concerned about predatory lending almost certainly 
could not pursue parens patriae cases in federal court.32
State courts might be more hospitable to such claims, but the parens 
patriae jurisprudence involving municipalities is sparse.33  Most of the 
states that have considered the question agree with the federal courts that 
municipalities and other political subdivisions may not pursue parens 
patriae actions because those units lack sovereignty.34  Several other states 
have focused more narrowly, concluding that political subdivisions may 
not assert claims on behalf of their residents against other government 
bodies while at least implicitly leaving open the possibility of parens 
patriae actions in other circumstances.35
We have found only one state where courts have clearly held that 
municipalities may pursue parens patriae actions on behalf of their 
 31. City of Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004); Mount Evans Co. 
v. Madigan, 14 F.3d 1444, 1453 n.3 (10th Cir. 1994); Colo. River Indian Tribes v. Town of 
Parker, 776 F.2d 846, 848 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. City of Pittsburg, 661 F.2d 783, 
786-87 (9th Cir. 1981); City of Rohnert Park v. Harris, 601 F.2d 1040, 1044-45 (9th Cir. 
1979); In re Multidist. Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 131 (9th Cir. 
1973). 
 32. See Kathleen C. Engel, Do Cities Have Standing? Redressing the Externalities of 
Predatory Lending, 38 CONN. L. REV. 355, 365-66 (2006). 
 33. Several state courts, like their counterparts in the lower federal judiciary, have 
avoided the issue of political-subdivision standing to pursue parens patriae claims.  See, 
e.g., Hayen v. County of Ogle, 463 N.E.2d 124, 127 (Ill. 1984) (noting that the issue had not 
been raised in the lower courts and that private parties clearly had standing in their own 
right); Town of Holbrook v. Town of Randolph, 373 N.E.2d 941, 943 (Mass. 1978) 
(rejecting the claim on the merits without resolving parens patriae standing). 
 34. See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Denver Bd. of Water Comm’rs, 718 P.2d 235, 
241 (Colo. 1986); Bd. of Comm’rs v. Kokomo City Plan Comm’n, 330 N.E.2d 92, 101 (Ind. 
1975); Clark County v. City of Las Vegas, 574 P.2d 1013, 1014 n.1 (Nev. 1978); County of 
Lexington v. City of Columbia, 400 S.E.2d 146, 147 (S.C. 1991). 
 35. See Douglas County Sch. Dist. 0001 v. Johanns, 694 N.W.2d 668, 673-74 (Neb. 
2005) (holding that a school district had failed to rebut the presumption that the state would 
adequately represent its interests in a challenge to the system of funding public schools); 
State v. City of Dover, 891 A.2d 524, 530-32 (N.H. 2006) (concluding that municipalities 
had not shown a compelling interest that would justify their independent lawsuits against 
manufacturers, suppliers, and distributors of the gasoline additive MBTE when the state was 
already pursuing its own lawsuit); Twp. of Stafford v. Stafford Twp. Zoning Bd. of 
Adjustment, 711 A.2d 282, 289 (N.J. 1998) (finding that “a municipal agency’s parens 
patriae interest in protecting the general public is insufficient to support standing to 
challenge an exercise of power by another municipal agency”); County of Bergen v. Port of 
N.Y. Auth., 160 A.2d 811, 815 (N.J. 1960) (finding that “each governmental entity is parens 
patriae within the orbit of its own political responsibility” but that “the Port Authority rather 
than the county . . . represents the residents of the Port District with respect to the public 
function entrusted to it”). 
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residents.  That state is New York, where two cases have held that local 
governments have authority to litigate parens patriae claims on behalf of 
their residents.  In City of New York v. Wyman,36 the supreme court justice 
(the trial judge in that state) held that the city had parens patriae standing 
to challenge a state policy limiting public funding for abortions for indigent 
women. The city was seeking to vindicate “a two-fold public interest”: a 
financial interest in avoiding unnecessary medical and social costs and a 
social interest in the health, safety, and welfare of city residents.37  The 
New York City charter explicitly authorized “actions in law or equity” in 
“any court” on behalf of “the city or any part or portion thereof, or of the 
people thereof,” so the municipal government had parens patriae 
standing.38  Although this decision was ultimately reversed on the merits, 
neither the New York Court of Appeals nor the dissenter in the appellate 
department (which affirmed the supreme court’s judgment) questioned the 
city’s standing.39  More recently, in Town of Riverhead v. Long Island 
Lighting Co.,40 a local government was held to have parens patriae 
standing to abate a public nuisance.41  It is possible that other local 
governments that enjoy strong home-rule authority could assert parens 
patriae claims for predatory lending.42  At this point, however, it seems 
unlikely that very many cities could do so.43
Even though cities probably lack parens patriae standing to go after 
predatory lenders, they might well be able to sue on their own behalf to 
seek relief for harm to the community itself.  Several courts that either did 
 36. 321 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct.), aff’d per curiam on other grounds, 322 N.Y.S.2d 957 
(App. Div. 1971), rev’d on other grounds, 281 N.E.2d 180 (N.Y. 1972). 
 37. Id. at 712-13. 
 38. Id. at 712. 
 39. See City of N.Y. v. Wyman, 322 N.Y.S.2d 957, 958 (App. Div. 1971) (Steuer, J., 
dissenting), rev’d, 281 N.E.2d 180 (N.Y. 1972). 
 40. 685 N.Y.S.2d 792 (App. Div. 1999) (mem.). 
 41. The court cited only Snapp in support of its conclusion that the town could sue on 
behalf of its residents.  Id. at 793.  But see Inc. Vill. of Northport v. Town of Huntington, 
604 N.Y.S.2d 587, 589 (App. Div. 1993) (finding no parens patriae standing where a local 
government simply aggregated “a collection of private suits” that did not assert quasi-
sovereign interests but allowing village trustees to sue as individual residents of the 
community). 
 42. For further discussion of home rule, see infra Part III. 
 43. An Illinois court has characterized “home rule units” (such as the City of Chicago) 
as “quasi-sovereign entities.”  In re County Collector, 774 N.E.2d 832, 847 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2002).  One commentator has characterized this language as supporting the notion that 
Illinois cities may bring parens patriae claims.  Engel, supra note 32, at 366.  Perhaps so, 
but that case did not address parens patriae.  Rather, the dispute concerned the legality of 
property taxes levied by the City of Chicago.  The Illinois Supreme Court chose not to 
decide whether “home rule units” or other political subdivisions may pursue parens patriae 
actions.  Hayen v. County of Ogle, 463 N.E.2d 124, 127 (Ill. 1984); see supra note 33. 
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not reach the parens patriae issue or concluded that political subdivisions 
had no such authority nonetheless have held that those governmental units 
had standing in their own right.  Most recently, the Ninth Circuit, in City of 
Sausalito v. O’Neill,44 held that a municipality had standing to challenge 
the adequacy of an environmental impact statement about plans to develop 
a former military base.  Although the city lacked sovereignty and thus 
could not sue as parens patriae,45 it did have standing to assert various 
harms to its proprietary interests.  Among those proprietary harms were 
increased traffic congestion that would raise management and traffic safety 
concerns, disrupt the community’s aesthetic appeal, reduce its tax revenues, 
impair air quality, increase air pollution, and degrade local parks, trails, and 
shore areas.46  Similarly, the D.C. Circuit, in City of Olmsted Falls v. 
FAA,47 did not resolve the question of parens patriae standing in a 
suburb’s challenge to the approval of a runway improvement project at 
Cleveland Hopkins International Airport because the suburb had asserted 
harm to its own economic interests, which was sufficient to confer 
standing.48
State courts have reached similar conclusions.  Two Colorado cases 
illustrate the point.  In Board of County Commissioners v. Denver Board of 
Water Commissioners,49 the state supreme court ruled that suburban 
counties lacked parens patriae standing but could sue in their own right to 
force the Denver water agency to continue supplying water on favorable 
terms.50  More recently, in Board of County Commissioners v. City of 
Denver,51 a state appellate court held that suburban governments could sue 
as direct parties to a contract limiting noise levels at the Denver 
International Airport even though the suburbs could not pursue parens 
 44. 386 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 45. Id. at 1197. 
 46. Id. at 1198-1200. 
 47. 292 F.3d 261 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 48. Id. at 268.  See also Mount Evans Co. v. Madigan, 14 F.3d 1444, 1451-53 (10th Cir. 
1994) (holding that a county had standing, based on loss of revenue, to challenge the U.S. 
Forest Service’s decision not to rebuild an income-generating structure that had been 
destroyed by a fire); Colo. River Indian Tribes v. Town of Parker, 776 F.2d 846, 848-49 
(9th Cir. 1985) (concluding that the town had standing, based on diminished sales tax 
revenue, to challenge the tribe’s regulation of liquor sales on land within the town); cf. City 
of Rohnert Park v. Harris, 601 F.2d 1040, 1044-45 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding that a city that 
wanted to develop its own regional shopping center lacked antitrust standing to assert its 
own proprietary interests in an effort to prevent a nearby community from developing a 
similar shopping center). 
 49. 718 P.2d 235 (Colo. 1986). 
 50. Id. at 241. 
 51. 40 P.3d 25 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001). 
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patriae actions.52
In short, cities interested in litigating predatory-lending claims will 
probably have to assert their own interests.  To do so in federal court they 
will have to satisfy both constitutional and prudential requirements.  The 
constitutional minima are that a plaintiff allege a legally cognizable “injury 
in fact” that is “fairly traceable” to the defendant’s conduct and likely to be 
“redressed by a favorable decision.”53  On the prudential side, a plaintiff 
must assert its own interests rather than those of third parties, may not sue 
over generalized grievances, and must be within the zone of interests 
protected by any statute on which it relies.54  Similar standing rules apply 
in many state courts, although some states have less stringent requirements 
in this regard.55
One possible claim that a city might assert would be based on the Fair 
Housing Act.56  As relevant to predatory lending, that statute prohibits 
racial discrimination in residential real estate transactions, including the 
financing of such transactions.57  Because predatory lending 
disproportionately affects persons of color,58 it is possible that the practice 
might violate the Fair Housing Act.  This suggestion raises two questions: 
(1) do cities have standing to sue under the Fair Housing Act, and (2) may 
a Fair Housing Act plaintiff prevail on a disparate-impact theory?  The 
answer to both questions is a qualified yes. 
 52. Id. at 32. 
 53. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 
167, 180-81 (2000); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). 
 54. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. 
Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982); Warth 
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500 (1975). 
 55. States are free to apply more permissive rules for standing in cases involving federal 
questions.  ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989).  Some do so.  See Engel, 
supra note 32, at 360-61; Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: 
Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1835-37 (2001).  For a critique 
of permissive state standing requirements, see Michael E. Solimine, Recalibrating 
Justiciability in Ohio Courts, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 531, 541-50 (2004). 
 56. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (2000). 
 57. Section 805(a) of the Fair Housing Act provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person or other entity whose business includes 
engaging in residential real estate-related transactions to discriminate against any 
person in making available such a transaction, or in the terms or conditions of 
such a transaction, because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, 
or national origin. 
42 U.S.C. § 3605(a).  Section 805(b)(1) defines covered transactions to include “the making 
or purchasing of loans or providing other financial assistance” for the purchase, 
construction, improvement, repair, or maintenance of a dwelling as well as loans or other 
financial assistance that are “secured by residential real estate.”  Id. § 3605(b)(1). 
 58. See supra note 2 and accompanying text; Engel, supra note 32, at 356 & n.6. 
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As to standing, the Supreme Court held in Gladstone, Realtors v. Village 
of Bellwood59 that a municipality can sue for its own injuries that result 
from Fair Housing Act violations.  At issue in that case were claims that 
real estate firms engaged in racial steering, showing African American 
customers homes in a twelve-by-thirteen-block section of town while 
showing white customers homes outside that area.60  The village argued 
that this practice unlawfully manipulated its housing market, undermining 
the stability of an integrated neighborhood and encouraging white flight.61  
This in turn would reduce property values and the tax base needed to 
support the provision of local services.62  Although the Fair Housing Act 
does not refer to municipalities or other governmental institutions as 
potential plaintiffs, the Court held that the village could be an “aggrieved 
person” for purposes of the statute.  The Act defines an “aggrieved person” 
as anyone “claim[ing] to have been injured by a discriminatory housing 
practice.”63  Congress may “expand standing to the full extent permitted 
by” the Constitution64 and had in fact done so in the Fair Housing Act.65  
Because the legislative branch had overridden prudential factors, standing 
under this statute was not limited to direct victims of discrimination.  All 
that mattered was that the village had suffered “actual injury as a result of 
the defendant’s conduct.”66  The key question was “not who possesses the 
legal rights protected by [the Fair Housing Act], but whether [Bellwood 
was] genuinely injured by conduct that violates someone’s [statutory] 
rights.”67  In other words, the village had to satisfy only the constitutional 
test for standing: injury in fact, causation, and redressability.  The 
complaint alleged that the real estate firms had engaged in racial 
discrimination that caused Bellwood to suffer a legally cognizable harm 
that could be rectified by a favorable judicial ruling.  That was sufficient 
for standing.68
 59. 441 U.S. 91 (1979). 
 60. Id. at 95. 
 61. Id. at 109-10. 
 62. Id. at 110-11. 
 63. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(i)(1) (2000). 
 64. Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 100. 
 65. Id. at 109 (holding that standing under the Fair Housing Act is “as broa[d] as is 
permitted by Article III of the Constitution”) (quoting Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 
409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 66. Id. at 103 n.9. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 111, 115.  Elsewhere in the opinion the Court cautioned that there might be 
limits to the geographical scope of a neighborhood that could be encompassed by a Fair 
Housing Act complaint.  That point appears in the discussion of the standing of individual 
plaintiffs.  Id. at 114.  It is not clear whether this observation applies to claims brought by 
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As to disparate impact, the Supreme Court has never determined 
whether discriminatory intent is necessary to establish a Fair Housing Act 
claim.69  The courts of appeals have generally held that proof of 
discriminatory intent is not necessary, but they have taken somewhat 
different approaches to disparate-impact claims.70  At the same time, there 
is general agreement that a showing of disparate impact does not suffice to 
prove a statutory violation.71
This discussion suggests that a city might have standing to assert a Fair 
Housing Act claim against predatory lenders.  The city would have to 
allege that predatory lenders were engaging in racial discrimination in real 
estate financing and that this discrimination harmed the city financially or 
socially.  These allegations would presumably satisfy the constitutional test 
for standing.  The city would not have to prove that the lenders 
intentionally discriminated against borrowers on the basis of race, but to 
prevail on the merits it would have to establish a disproportionate impact 
on residents of color that was not sufficiently justified.  The likelihood of 
success in such an endeavor is unclear.  Suffice it to say that we have not 
found any reported case in which a city has advanced a Fair Housing Act 
claim for predatory lending. 
One leading commentator has suggested that, in light of the complexity 
of standing doctrine, cities face potentially insurmountable obstacles to 
pursuing some alternative claims against predatory lending.72  Other such 
claims could be difficult to prove on the merits.73  For our purposes, what 
matters is that cities face numerous uncertainties if they decide to litigate 
directly against predatory lending.  For this reason, many communities 
have chosen instead to try to regulate the practice.  As the next section 
makes clear, that approach presents its own challenges. 
cities or other political subdivisions. 
 69. Peter E. Mahoney, The End(s) of Disparate Impact: Doctrinal Reconstruction, Fair 
Housing and Lending Law, and the Antidiscrimination Principle, 47 EMORY L.J. 409, 425 
n.54 (1998). 
 70. See, e.g., Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 2000); 
Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 934-36 (2d Cir.), aff’d 
per curiam, 488 U.S. 15 (1988); Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 575 (6th Cir. 
1986); Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir. 1982); Metro. Hous. Dev. 
Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977). 
 71. See, e.g., Langlois, 207 F.3d at 49-50. 
 72. Engel, supra note 32, at 378-82 (discussing fraud and unfair or deceptive practices 
claims). 
 73. Id. at 382-86 (discussing public nuisance and unjust enrichment). 
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III. CITIES AS REGULATORS: THE MEANING AND LIMITS OF  
HOME RULE 
Traditionally, cities had very limited authority.  Under the influential 
Dillon’s Rule, municipalities could exercise only those powers that the 
state explicitly granted or that flowed by clear and necessary implication 
from explicit grants, with all doubts resolved against the existence of local 
authority.74  The restrictive approach embodied in Dillon’s Rule proved to 
be quite controversial, because many people believe that local autonomy 
promotes important social and political values.75  The great majority of 
states eventually conferred some variant of home rule on municipalities.76  
Even when cities have home rule, however, state law might preempt local 
initiatives.  This section focuses on state preemption of local ordinances, 
with particular reference to cases that have resulted in reported judicial 
 74. See JOHN F. DILLON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 55, at 
101-02 (2d ed. 1872) (“It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal 
corporation possesses, and can exercise, the following powers, and no others: First, those 
granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in, or incident to, the 
powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the 
corporation—not simply convenient, but indispensable.”); see also JOHN F. DILLON, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 237, at 448-49 (5th ed. 1911) 
(“It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corporation possesses 
and can exercise the following powers, and no others: First, those granted in express words; 
second, those necessarily or fairly implied in, or incident to, the powers expressly granted; 
third, those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation—not simply 
convenient, but indispensable.” ) (internal citations omitted). 
  The Supreme Court similarly held that cities, as creatures of the state, generally 
enjoyed no federal constitutional protections against the states.  See Hunter v. City of 
Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907) (“The state, . . . at its pleasure, may modify or 
withdraw [any governmental] powers [it has entrusted to municipal corporations] . . . with 
or without the consent of the [city’s] citizens, or even against their protest.”). 
 75. Supporters note that home rule promotes democratic participation, facilitates the 
adoption of public policies that take account of local needs and local opinion, promotes and 
enhances a sense of community, and affords opportunities for reform and innovation.  See 
Richard Briffault, Home Rule for the Twenty-first Century, 36 URB. LAW. 253, 258-60 
(2004). 
 76. Prominent scholars disagree over the extent to which home rule actually empowers 
cities and whether municipal autonomy necessarily promotes the public interest.  Compare 
Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1980) (contending 
that the legal authority of cities remains unacceptably weak), with Richard Briffault, Our 
Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1990) 
(arguing that home rule prevents effective regional approaches to social problems and 
aggravates many of them), and Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and 
Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346 (1990) (criticizing unquestioning support for local 
autonomy); see also David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255 
(2003) (suggesting that home rule embodies a complex mixture of both grants and 
limitations on local authority). 
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decisions.77
Since North Carolina enacted its pioneering predatory lending law in 
1999,78 almost twenty cities and other local governments have considered 
similar proposals.79  Almost all of the measures that passed faced 
immediate legal challenges as well as efforts to obtain preemptive state 
legislation.80  Courts in three large states—New York, California, and 
Ohio—have issued published decisions addressing the question of state 
preemption of local predatory lending ordinances.  The New York and 
California courts ruled against the cities, but the situation in Ohio is more 
complex: the state’s appellate courts have taken divergent approaches to 
the issue, but a recent supreme court ruling has found two municipal 
ordinances to be preempted by state law.  These decisions suggest that, at 
the very least, local laws and policies face a high likelihood of frustration if 
opponents can influence state authorities to act. 
The first of the state preemption cases, Mayor of New York v. Council of 
New York,81 invalidated an ordinance that forbade the city from doing 
business with predatory lenders.82  The court held that the state’s banking 
 77. More than two dozen states have enacted predatory lending laws.  Local 
governments had not acted in most of those states, so preemption was not always at issue.  
For a summary of the provisions of the state laws, see Baher Azmy, Squaring the Predatory 
Lending Circle, 57 FLA. L. REV. 295, 361-78 (2005). 
 78. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-1.1E, 24-10.2 (West 2004); see supra note 5 (citing 
evaluations of this measure). 
 79. See Giang Ho & Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Impact of Local Predatory 
Lending Laws, app. B, at 44 (Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Paper No. 2005-
049B, 2005), available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2005/2005-049.pdf. 
 80. In Philadelphia, for example, opponents filed suit in state court.  Even before the 
court could rule on the ordinance’s validity, the state legislature enacted its own bill that 
expressly preempted all municipal regulation of predatory lending.  See Kimm Tynan, Note, 
Pennsylvania Welcomes Predatory Lenders: Pennsylvania’s Act 55 Preempts 
Philadelphia’s Tough Ordinance But Provides Little Protection for Vulnerable Borrowers, 
34 RUTGERS L.J. 837, 872-84 (2003).  Meanwhile, in Atlanta, a trial court enjoined the 
enforcement of a local ordinance; the state legislature subsequently passed its own bill that 
preempted municipal initiatives.  See Azmy, supra note 77, at 362 n.348; Anne-Marie 
Motto, Note, Skirting the Law: How Predatory Mortgage Lenders Are Destroying the 
American Dream, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 859, 896 n.298 (2002) (citing Milo Ippolito, 
Finance Statutes Defeated in Courts, ATLANTA J. CONST., Nov. 3, 2001, at 4H). 
 81. 780 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Sup. Ct. 2004). 
 82. The case arose in an odd posture: the city council passed the ordinance over the 
mayor’s veto, after which the mayor sought a declaratory judgment that the ordinance was 
invalid so that he would not have to enforce the measure.  Id. at 269 & n.1.  This was not the 
only recent legal dispute between the mayor and the city council over the validity and 
enforceability of a New York City ordinance.  Another dispute involved the validity of a 
measure (also enacted over a mayoral veto) forbidding the city from contracting with 
businesses that fail to provide benefits to registered domestic partners of their employees 
equal to those afforded to the spouses of their married workers.  See Council of N.Y. v. 
Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d 433, 435 (N.Y. 2006).  The complexity of those issues is reflected 
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law, which included specific provisions dealing with “high-cost” loans, 
preempted the ordinance.83  The opinion suggests two separate grounds for 
preemption: field and conflict.  As to the former, the state statute was “a 
comprehensive regulatory scheme” that occupied the entire field.84  Indeed, 
the banking law specifically “provide[d] for ‘uniform regulation of the 
residential mortgage lending process.’”85  Accordingly, the absence of 
language expressly preempting local predatory lending measures could not 
save the ordinance; the detailed state law suggested that there was no room 
for local legislation relating to predatory lending.86  As to the latter, the city 
ordinance contained provisions that were “in substantial conflict” with the 
state law and would therefore “disrupt the operation” of that statute.87
Just over a year later, a closely divided California Supreme Court, in 
American Financial Services Ass’n v. City of Oakland,88 ruled that state 
law preempted another predatory lending ordinance.  Both measures 
directly regulated home loans.89  Oakland’s ordinance was stricter than the 
California statute.90  Notwithstanding that difference, the majority relied on 
field preemption and only indirectly addressed conflict preemption.  The 
state had implicitly occupied the field.  Therefore, despite the absence of 
language of express preemption, the state measure left no room for local 
regulation.91  The state, rather than local governments, traditionally had 
regulated mortgage lending even before the adoption of the predatory 
lending law.92  Moreover, statewide regulation was essential.  The housing 
market was “critical” to the California economy, and statewide regulation 
was “essential” because mortgage-backed securities were sold 
nationwide.93  Allowing municipalities to set their own standards would 
in the close division in the New York Court of Appeals, which split 4-3 in that case.  Id. at 
447. 
 83. The state law was adopted shortly after the mayor vetoed the ordinance.  Mayor of 
New York, 780 N.Y.S.2d at 274. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 273-74 (quoting N.Y. BANKING LAW § 589 (McKinney 2006)). 
 86. Id. at 274. 
 87. Id. at 275.  The court also held that the city ordinance was “substantially” preempted 
by federal law.  Id. at 276; see infra notes 150-57 and accompanying text. 
 88. 104 P.3d 813 (Cal. 2005). 
 89. The state law was enacted eight days after the ordinance.  Id. at 815. 
 90. For example, the Oakland ordinance applied to holders in due course, prohibited 
most prepayment penalties, and required either that borrowers be provided with loan 
counseling or that they explicitly waive such counseling.  The state law did not apply to 
holders in due course, permitted prepayment penalties, and required only that borrowers be 
encouraged to seek loan counseling.  See id. at 819. 
 91. Id. at 820. 
 92. Id. at 822. 
 93. Id. at 823. 
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undermine the “centralized and uniform” rules necessary for the economic 
welfare of all California residents.94
Everyone involved in the Oakland case, including the city and the 
dissenting justices in this 4-3 decision, agreed that the state had a powerful 
interest in predatory lending.95  This consensus mattered, because the 
California Constitution allows local governments to “make and enforce . . . 
all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in 
conflict with general laws”96 and also permits home rule communities to 
“make and enforce all ordinances and regulations in respect to municipal 
affairs, . . . and in respect to other matters they shall be subject to general 
laws.”97  If predatory lending was not a municipal affair but rather a 
question of statewide concern, the case turned on whether the Oakland 
ordinance conflicted with the state law. 
Disagreement centered on the strength of the evidence that the 
legislature had implicitly preempted local initiatives and on whether the 
state’s regulatory interest was sufficiently powerful to trump the city’s 
interest in dealing with the adverse social and economic consequences of 
the practice within its own borders.  The dissenters emphasized undisputed 
evidence in the legislative history that mortgage lenders had strongly and 
unsuccessfully lobbied for language expressly preempting measures such 
as the Oakland ordinance.98  In fact, that measure was specifically 
discussed in a state senate committee hearing.99  In the end, supporters of 
the bill that the legislature ultimately enacted chose to say nothing at all 
about preemption for fear that including such a provision would doom the 
measure.100  This evidence strongly suggested that the legislature had not 
implicitly preempted the Oakland ordinance.101  Moreover, the city had 
persuasive grounds for adopting its own rules to supplement the state’s 
approach to predatory lending.  The practice was unusually common in 
Oakland, disadvantaging both the borrowers who were victimized by 
abusive practices and the community as a whole.102  Under the 
 94. Id. at 825. 
 95. Id. at 820 (noting that the city “reasonably concedes regulation of predatory 
practices in mortgage lending is one of statewide concern”); id. at 832 (George, C.J., 
dissenting) (observing that “regulation of predatory lending undoubtedly is an area of 
statewide concern”). 
 96. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7. 
 97. Id. § 5(a). 
 98. City of Oakland, 104 P.3d at 830-31 (George, C.J., dissenting). 
 99. Id. at 830. 
 100. Id. at 831. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 832-33. 
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circumstances, it was at least as plausible to conclude that the legislature 
intended to establish minimum statewide standards that local governments 
could supplement as to find an unarticulated intention to preempt the entire 
field of predatory lending regulation.103  The Oakland ordinance did not 
“undermine” or “subvert” state regulations but simply afforded “additional 
protections” to city residents who were “especially vulnerable” to the shady 
practices of predatory lenders.104
The majority rejected both lines of this analysis.  First, this was a case of 
implied preemption.105  Determining whether the legislature implicitly 
preempted local measures must be inferred not simply from the statutory 
text but also from the nature, purpose, and scope of the state regulatory 
scheme.106  Any other approach would effectively eliminate the entire 
doctrine of implied preemption.107  Second, the structure and purpose of 
the state law showed that it left no room for local regulation.  Allowing 
more stringent city ordinances would discourage legitimate subprime 
lenders from making loans and either increase the cost or eliminate the 
availability of such loans to lower-income borrowers.108  The nature of the 
problem suggested a need for “centralized and uniform” rules, which in 
turn undercut the argument that the state statute set minimum standards that 
cities could augment.109
We need not determine which side had the better of the arguments.  For 
present purposes, it suffices that in California, as in New York, courts have 
held that state laws preempt city ordinances addressing predatory lending.  
The situation in Ohio has been somewhat settled until very recently.  The 
applicable home rule guarantee in that state provides: “Municipalities shall 
have authority to exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt 
and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other similar 
regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws.”110  Three large cities 
in the Buckeye State have adopted predatory lending ordinances; different 
districts of the Ohio Court of Appeals have reached divergent conclusions 
about the validity of those ordinances; the Ohio Supreme Court recently 
held that two of those ordinances were unconstitutional. 
 103. Id. at 834. 
 104. Id. at 835. 
 105. Id. at 820 (majority opinion). 
 106. Id. at 826-27. 
 107. Id. at 827. 
 108. Id. at 824. 
 109. Id. at 825. 
 110. OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3. 
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The first Ohio decision came in City of Dayton v. State,111 in which the 
Ohio Court of Appeals for the Second District found a local ordinance to be 
preempted by state law.  As in Oakland and New York City, Dayton 
adopted its predatory lending ordinance before the state legislature enacted 
a statute dealing with the same subject.112  Shortly after the state law 
became effective, the city sought a declaratory judgment that the statute’s 
preemption provision violated the home rule provision of the Ohio 
Constitution.113  The appellate court first concluded that Dayton’s 
predatory lending ordinance did not deal with a matter of “local self-
government” within the meaning of the constitutional home rule guarantee, 
but rather with “the use of police powers.”114  Applying a two-part test, the 
court went on to hold that the preemption provision of the state statute was 
a general law and that the Dayton ordinance conflicted with it, so the local 
measure had to give way.115
First, the state preemption provision satisfied the applicable four-part 
test for general laws.116  That measure was part of a comprehensive bill 
that addressed many aspects of predatory lending.  Gaps and possible 
imperfections in that bill did not render it less than comprehensive.117  
Moreover, the statute applied throughout the state, dealt with the police 
power, and established a general rule of conduct.118
Second, although the home rule provision allows cities to adopt stricter 
regulations than the state,119 Dayton’s ordinance conflicted in several 
particulars with the state law.  The only example the court cited was the 
annual percentage rate (“APR”) for loans defined as predatory.  The state 
law defined as predatory those loans with an APR that exceeds the yield on 
benchmark Treasury bills by more than ten percentage points,120 while 
 111. 813 N.E.2d 707 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004). 
 112. Id. at 710; see also supra note 81 and accompanying text (discussing New York City 
and New York State); supra text accompanying notes 98-99 (discussing Oakland and 
California).  City ordinances in other states also seem to have stimulated state action.  See 
supra note 80 (discussing ordinances in Philadelphia and Atlanta that apparently led to the 
passage of state laws in Pennsylvania and Georgia). 
 113. City of Dayton, 813 N.E.2d at 712.  For the language of the home rule provision, see 
supra text accompanying note 110. 
 114. City of Dayton, 813 N.E.2d at 714. 
 115. Id. at 722, 725.  Before getting to the two-part test, the court extensively reviewed 
and found it impossible to resolve the Ohio Supreme Court’s conflicting rulings about the 
meaning of “statewide concern” and preemption.  Id. at 714-21, 721-22. 
 116. See City of Canton v. State, 766 N.E.2d 963, 964-65 (syl.), 968 (Ohio 2002). 
 117. City of Dayton, 813 N.E.2d at 723. 
 118. Id. at 724. 
 119. Id. at 725-26. 
 120. Id. at 711, 725. 
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Dayton’s ordinance apparently set a lower threshold.121  This disparity 
represented an impermissible implied conflict.122  Moreover, a provision in 
the ordinance that forbade the city from contracting with predatory 
lenders—a measure analogous to the New York City ordinance that was 
struck down a few months earlier123—was an illegitimate effort by the city 
to do indirectly what state law prohibited it from doing directly, to regulate 
predatory lending.124
Six months later, in American Financial Services Ass’n v. City of 
Cleveland,125 the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Eighth District reached the 
opposite conclusion and upheld a different predatory lending ordinance as a 
legitimate exercise of home rule.  At issue here, as in City of Dayton, was 
the validity of the preemption provision in the state law.  Although the 
analytical framework was the same in both cases, the Eighth District in City 
of Cleveland fundamentally disagreed with the Second District in City of 
Dayton.  Both courts did find that predatory lending ordinance was in every 
important respect a police power regulation, not an exercise of local self-
government.126  In all other respects, however, the City of Cleveland court 
came out the other way than did its City of Dayton counterpart. 
The Eighth District’s analysis in City of Cleveland began by observing 
that the Ohio Constitution’s home rule guarantee prevents the legislature 
from completely preempting municipal authority.127  Focusing exclusively 
on the preemption provision instead of the entire state statute, the court 
held that this measure could not be a general law because it did not apply to 
“citizens generally” but covered only local legislative bodies.128  For this 
reason, the preemption provision was unconstitutional.129
Turning next to preemption, the City of Cleveland court found no 
conflict between the city ordinance and the state law.  The state law set 
minimum standards that the city was free to strengthen.  The city had not 
explicitly allowed anything specifically prohibited by state law, nor did the 
state law expressly allow anything specifically prohibited by the city 
ordinance.130  Of course, there might be an implicit conflict between the 
 121. Id. at 725.  Curiously, the opinion does not specify the threshold set by the 
ordinance. 
 122. Id. at 726-27. 
 123. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text. 
 124. City of Dayton, 813 N.E.2d at 727. 
 125. 824 N.E.2d 553 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004), rev’d, 858 N.E.2d 776 (Ohio 2006). 
 126. Id. at 558. 
 127. Id. at 559. 
 128. Id. at 560. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
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statute and the ordinance.131  That possibility had no legal significance, 
however, because the Eighth District saw no justification in Ohio law for 
recognizing the doctrine of implied preemption.132
About six months after this ruling (and just over a year after City of 
Dayton was decided), the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Sixth District, in 
American Financial Services Ass’n v. City of Toledo,133 upheld the main 
provisions of yet another predatory lending ordinance using an analysis 
similar to that in City of Cleveland.  The opinion in City of Toledo, 
however, contained a more detailed analysis of the issues.  The Sixth 
District, like the Second District in City of Dayton,134 began by focusing on 
the entire state predatory lending statute rather than on its preemption 
provision, and concluded that the state measure was a general law.135  
Nevertheless, relying heavily on the Eighth District’s analysis in City of 
Cleveland, the City of Toledo court held that the statute’s preemption 
provision violated the Ohio Constitution’s home rule guarantee.136  
Although the preemption provision did not invalidate the entire Toledo 
ordinance, two relatively minor provisions of the ordinance did conflict 
with the state law.137  Both of those provisions were severable,138 so the 
balance of the ordinance remained a valid exercise of municipal 
authority.139
This brief summary makes clear that Ohio courts have disagreed not 
only about whether cities have home rule authority to regulate predatory 
lending but also about how to analyze that question.  The Second District in 
City of Dayton held that cities do not have such authority, while the Eighth 
District in City of Cleveland and the Sixth District in City of Toledo held 
 131. The Cleveland ordinance had lower thresholds for interest rates, points, and fees as 
well as somewhat different disclosure requirements than did the state law.  The ordinance 
also dealt with several issues that the state law did not address at all.  See id. at 557. 
 132. Id. at 560. 
 133. 830 N.E.2d 1233 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005), rev’d, 859 N.E.2d 923 (Ohio 2006). 
 134. See supra notes 111-24 and accompanying text. 
 135. City of Toledo, 830 N.E.2d at 1243-44. 
 136. Id. at 1244.  In support of its conclusion on this issue, the City of Toledo court 
quoted two pages of the City of Cleveland opinion.  See id. at 1244-45 (quoting Am. Fin. 
Servs. Ass’n v. City of Cleveland, 824 N.E.2d 553, 560-61 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004), appeal 
allowed, 825 N.E.2d 622 (Ohio 2005)). 
 137. One conflict concerned the penalties for payments under a home-improvement 
contract, the other with the cancellation period for credit insurance.  Id. at 1246-47. 
 138. Id. at 1248. 
 139. The court also found that the private right of action created by the ordinance violated 
the separation of powers doctrine by intruding on judicial authority and that two other 
provisions were void for vagueness, but all of these relatively minor provisions also were 
severable.  Id. at 1249-51.  It bears emphasis that the problems with these provisions had 
nothing to do with the city’s home rule powers. 
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that they do.  At the same time, the Sixth and Eighth Districts disagreed 
about whether to focus exclusively on the state law’s preemption provision 
or on the statute as a whole.  The Sixth District in City of Toledo agreed 
with the Second District in City of Dayton that what mattered was the entire 
statute, but they disagreed about whether that statute displaced municipal 
regulation of predatory lending. 
As this Article was going to press, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the 
Eighth District and held that the Cleveland ordinance was unconstitutional.  
In American Financial Services Ass’n v. City of Cleveland,140 the court 
concluded that the state’s legislation regulating predatory lending was a 
general law141 and that the more stringent provisions of the Cleveland 
ordinance conflicted with the state measure.142  A concurring justice 
reasoned that the state had validly expressed its intention to occupy the 
field and that the ordinance was therefore preempted regardless of any 
conflict with state law.143  Two dissenting justices would have upheld the 
Cleveland ordinance.  One found no conflict with state law;144 the other 
thought that regulation of mortgage lending was not a matter of statewide 
concern and hence that municipalities remained free to adopt more 
stringent rules about predatory lending than the legislature had enacted.145  
A month later, relying on this ruling, the court struck down the Toledo 
ordinance as well.146
The divergent approaches in the Ohio courts should not obscure the 
lesson of this section: it is far from clear that cities have home rule 
authority to regulate predatory lending at all, at least if the state has enacted 
its own legislation in this field.  Even if the Ohio Supreme Court upholds 
the power of Buckeye State cities, the New York and California decisions 
involving the New York City and Oakland ordinances stand as a warning 
that in two of our largest and most influential states, municipalities have no 
power to regulate predatory lending no matter how much harm that practice 
may do to local residents and the local social fabric.  This does not 
necessarily mean that cities should sit idly by in the face of abuses. After 
 140. 858 N.E.2d 776 (Ohio 2006). 
 141. Id. at 784. 
 142. Id. at 785-86. 
 143. Id. at 790 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment only). 
 144. Id. at 791 (Resnick, J., dissenting). 
 145. Id. at 795, 797-98 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).  A thorough evaluation of these issues is 
beyond the scope of this Article.  One of the authors is working on a separate paper that 
does seek to analyze the proper scope of home rule authority to regulate predatory lending 
in Ohio.  See Shadya Y. Yazback, Home Lending and Home Rule in Ohio: Municipal 
Regulation of Predatory Lending (unpublished manuscript on file with the authors). 
 146. Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. City of Toledo, 859 N.E.2d 923 (Ohio 2006) (mem.). 
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all, some states might permit cities to adopt their own ordinances.  Even in 
states that do not allow local action, city initiatives might well stimulate 
state legislation.  This was the pattern in all three of these states and in 
others as well.147  Nevertheless, the several decisions discussed in this 
section serve as a warning about the limits of municipal action against 
predatory lending. 
IV. FEDERAL PREEMPTION 
Even if some cities have authority under state law to regulate predatory 
lending, they might face yet another insurmountable obstacle: federal 
preemption.  Many lending institutions that make home loans are regulated 
by the federal government.  The National Bank Act authorizes the Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency to regulate nationally chartered banks,148 
and the Home Owners Loan Act authorizes the Office of Thrift Supervision 
to regulate federal savings associations.149
In Mayor of New York v. Council of New York,150 a case discussed 
earlier in connection with home rule,151 the court held that New York 
City’s ordinance prohibiting the city from doing business with predatory 
lenders was preempted by federal law to the extent that the ordinance 
applied to federally chartered banks and federal savings associations.  With 
respect to nationally chartered banks, regulations issued by the Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency preempted several provisions of the 
ordinance,152 and the Exportation Doctrine of the National Bank Act 
preempted local restrictions on interest rates.153  Even without a clear 
conflict between the ordinance and Comptroller of the Currency 
regulations, allowing the city to apply its requirements to national banks 
would create an obstacle to the fulfillment of federal policies.  That 
sufficed to find these provisions of the ordinance preempted to the extent 
 147. See supra notes 80, 83, 98-100; supra text accompanying note 112. 
 148. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1, 371 (2000). 
 149. Id. §§ 1462a-1464. 
 150. 780 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Sup. Ct. 2004). 
 151. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text. 
 152. Mayor of New York, 780 N.Y.S.2d at 272. 
 153. Id.  The Exportation Doctrine is based on 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2000) (allowing a national 
bank to charge interest “at the rate allowed by the laws of the State, Territory, or District 
where the bank is located”).  See Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735 (1996); 
Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978).  
For a comprehensive discussion of the Exportation Doctrine, see Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The 
Amazing, Elastic, Ever-Expanding Exportation Doctrine and Its Effect on Predatory 
Lending Regulation, 88 MINN. L. REV. 518, 539-600 (2004). 
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that it applied to national banks.154  Moreover, to the extent that 
enforcement of some parts of the ordinance entailed giving the city access 
to the records of national banks and allowing it to regulate activities 
permitted by federal law, those parts purported to confer on the city 
impermissible visitorial power over such banks without proper 
authorization.155  With respect to federal savings associations, Office of 
Thrift Supervision regulations expressly preempted many provisions of the 
New York ordinance.156  In any event, federal regulation was sufficiently 
pervasive as to occupy the field, leaving no room for local initiatives 
applicable to such institutions.157
The possibility of federal preemption goes well beyond local initiatives, 
however.  Both the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the 
Office of Thrift Supervision have taken the position that federal law 
preempts state as well as municipal predatory lending initiatives.158  No 
court has yet addressed that position with regard to state predatory lending 
laws.  At the same time, a federal district court in Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency v. Spitzer159 recently held that federal regulations prevent 
state authorities from enforcing fair housing laws against national banks.160
Assuming that federal law and regulations do preempt state and local 
predatory lending initiatives,161 cities that have home rule authority to act 
 154. Mayor of New York, 780 N.Y.S.2d at 272. 
 155. Id.; see 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) (2000) (“No national bank shall be subject to any 
visitorial powers except as authorized by Federal law, vested in the courts of justice or such 
as shall be, or have been exercised or directed by Congress or by either House thereof or by 
any committee of Congress or of either House duly authorized.”).  The Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency has promulgated a regulation that defines visitorial authority as 
“exclusive,” and to include “conducting examinations, inspecting or requiring the 
production of books or records of national banks.”  12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4000(a)(3),  7.4000(a)(1) 
(2007). 
 156. Mayor of New York, 780 N.Y.S.2d at 271 & n.7. 
 157. Id. at 272.  Finally, the court found that section 501 of the Depository Institutions 
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a (2000), expressly preempted 
interest rates, points, and fees for first mortgages on one- to four-family residences.  Mayor 
of New York, 780 N.Y.S.2d at 272-73. 
 158. See Julia Patterson Forrester, Still Mortgaging the American Dream: Predatory 
Lending, Preemption, and Federally Supported Lenders, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1303, 1339-40 
(2006). 
 159. 396 F. Supp. 2d 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 160. See also Clearing House Ass’n v. Spitzer, 394 F. Supp. 2d 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(reaching the same conclusion in a case brought by commercial banks). 
 161. Resolving whether federal law should preempt such initiatives is beyond the scope 
of this Article.  Most commentators have criticized broad federal preemption as either 
unauthorized by current law or unwise as a matter of policy.  See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley, 
Note, The Unwarranted Regulatory Preemption of Predatory Lending Laws, 79 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 2274 (2004); Keith R. Fisher, Toward a Basal Tenth Amendment: A Riposte to 
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might still have some reason to adopt predatory lending ordinances.  After 
all, federal preemption applies only to federally regulated financial 
institutions.  Not all home loans are made by such institutions or by entities 
that are related to them.  Although precise data are hard to come by, a 
noticeable fraction of these loans is made by so-called nondepository 
institutions, i.e., entities other than commercial banks, savings institutions, 
and credit unions.162  Information compiled by the Federal Reserve System 
shows that mortgage companies (which are nondepository institutions) 
received more than 60 percent of all home loan applications in 2005 even 
though such companies made up only about one-fifth of the total number of 
lenders.163  Some mortgage companies are affiliated with federally 
regulated depository institutions, but approximately 15 percent were 
independent and therefore not subject to federal regulation.164  We should 
treat these figures with caution, however, because the Federal Reserve 
study covers only about 80 percent of the country’s home lending.165  
Although we are dealing with an estimate, there is no reason to doubt that 
at least some predatory loans are not subject to federal regulation.  That 
leaves room for state and local measures applicable to lenders that are not 
encompassed by expansive federal preemption. 
The justification for cities with home rule power to adopt predatory 
lending ordinances might be stronger in some communities than in others. 
Subprime lending—which is not necessarily, but often is, predatory166—
has grown significantly in recent years, and that growth has not been 
uniform.167  In some places, as many as half of all home loans are made by 
entities that are not subject to federal oversight.168  Cities facing that 
situation might find it important to fill this regulatory void, even if local 
ordinances might be able to address only part of the predatory lending 
National Bank Preemption of State Consumer Protection Laws, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
981 (2006); Forrester, supra note 158, at 1359-70; Diana McMonagle, Note, In Pursuit of 
Safety and Soundness: An Analysis of the OCC’s Anti-Predatory Lending Standard, 31 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1533 (2004). 
 162. Avery et al., supra note 14, at A129. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at A123. 
 166. See supra text accompanying note 8. 
 167. See Susan M. Wachter et al., Subprime Lending: Neighborhood Patterns Over Time 
in US Cities (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Inst. for Law and Econ. Research Paper No. 06-19, 
2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=920847. 
 168. See, e.g., Becky Gaylord, City Let Banks Ignore Law, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, 
Sept. 22, 2006, at A1 (citing a study finding that, in Cleveland, banks and other regulated 
entities made about 70 percent of home loans in 2000 but only around 50 percent of such 
loans in 2005). 
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problem. 
CONCLUSION 
Communities that experience the abuses associated with predatory 
lending have powerful reasons for seeking to combat the many harms 
resulting from that phenomenon.  Unfortunately, they have only limited 
legal tools available for this purpose.  Cities cannot sue as parens patriae in 
federal court, and they might not be able to do so in many state courts.  
They might have standing to seek relief for harm to the community, as 
opposed to individual residents, but such lawsuits could founder on 
difficult problems of proof.  Directly regulating predatory lending poses 
additional challenges.  It is far from clear that cities have authority under 
their home rule powers.  Even if they do, state statutes might preempt 
important aspects of municipal ordinances.  Perhaps more daunting, the 
prospect of federal preemption of even state laws to the extent that those 
laws apply to federally regulated lenders further limits the possibilities for 
effective local measures. 
Nevertheless, there might be good reasons for cities to consider adopting 
their own regulations.  Most important, some cities might have the 
authority to act.  Even if that authority is limited or nonexistent, municipal 
ordinances have stimulated state legislation.  To be sure, state measures 
have not been as strong as the local initiatives that prompted them.  At the 
same time, getting even a weak statute enacted provides an opportunity for 
strengthening amendments in the future.  Perhaps state measures can help 
to persuade federal authorities either to cut back on the scope of 
preemption or to take more vigorous action against predatory lenders 
within the sphere of their authority.  Additionally, federal preemption 
applies only to national banks, federal savings associations, and their 
affiliates.  Although that covers a wide swath of residential lending, it still 
allows for local action against other lenders that might have a significant 
effect on a city’s social fabric.  In the end, cities working alone cannot 
solve the predatory lending problem.  Some of them might, however, help 
to serve as catalysts for whatever solutions might be devised. 
